

Security Sector Perspectives on Nuclear and Radiological Security in Nigeria

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Abstract

Nuclear material and radioactive sources are ubiquitous in various aspects of Nigeria's economy including the medical, industrial, agricultural and research sectors. Their use contributes significantly to Nigeria's GDP but could be a source of threat should they fall into wrong hands. Thus, securing nuclear and other radioactive material holds significant implications for health, the environment, economy and national security. To this end, legislative, regulatory and institutional frameworks are emplaced to secure them in use, storage and transport, including disused sources in Nigeria, with the security sector playing a pivotal role within these frameworks. This perspective is oftentimes not accorded adequate attention in literature. In this regard and given Nigeria's current evolving security landscape, this paper maps out key actors in Nigeria's security sector such as the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Department of State Services (DSS), the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and Nigerian Custom Service (NCS) as well as the regulator, Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NNRA) and licensee, among others, vis-a-vis nuclear and radiological security. The paper further x-rays existing legislative and institutional frameworks and highlights the collective roles of security agencies as key actors in combating illicit trafficking of radioactive material as well as identifies areas of improvement in the current approach. It argues that Nigeria's security agencies have demonstrated commitment to securing nuclear and radioactive material within the existing robust legislative, institutional and regulatory framework, though efforts needs to be sustained to bolster nuclear security in the country. This is in the area of fostering increased inter-agency collaboration, human resource development, training and capacity building of a skilled workforce, enhance awareness creation among personnel, leveraging international cooperation and partnerships as well as procurement and use of state-of-the-art detection equipment. This is all with a view to countering emerging threats and effectively preventing the theft, loss, or malicious use of nuclear material, thereby safeguarding Nigeria's population and contributing to global nuclear and radiological security efforts.

Key words: Nuclear security, radiological security, radioactive sources, illicit trafficking of radioactive sources

1.0 Introduction

Nuclear and radioactive sources play a vital role in the global economy. Indeed, the peaceful use of nuclear technology has become ubiquitous and varied that nearly every country employs some form of nuclear material or nuclear derived technology (National Nuclear Security Administration, 2021). From energy production to treatment of diseases, industry, agriculture, and research, these uses have improved lives and wellbeing of society as well as accelerated economic development worldwide. In Africa, nuclear materials have been exploited for economic development as the continent has an abundant supply of uranium in Namibia, Niger, Gabon, and Nigeria, among others. Moreover, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Libya, Kenya have stated plans to develop nuclear power plants for electricity generation while Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Libya, and Morocco have operating nuclear research reactors, with only South Africa having two nuclear power reactors (Lowbeer-Lewis, 2010).

In addition to operating a research reactor, Nigeria being a member of the IAEA since 1962 and signatory to a number of international treaties, harnesses nuclear and radioactive sources in research, petroleum industry, agriculture and medical use for socioeconomic development. Their continued use contributes significantly to Nigeria's GDP but could be a source of threat should they fall into wrong hands. Although Nigeria Research Reactor-1 (NIRR-1) has operated

for two decades without security incident (NAEC, 2024; Ahmed, 2020), the current evolving security landscape necessitates adequate measures to secure nuclear and other radioactive material given the implications to health, environment, economy and national security.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stresses the value of nuclear security to protect people, property, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. It defines nuclear security as “the prevention, detection, and response to, criminal or intentional, unauthorized acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities (IAEA, 2013). The IAEA also urges its member states to prioritize nuclear security measures given the increased reoccurrence of incidents involving trafficking, theft, loss, or malicious intent and activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials around the world as signified in the 2024 Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Factsheet.

To achieve this, Nigeria has in place a nuclear security regime comprising legislative, institutional and regulatory frameworks to guarantee the safe and secure use of nuclear and radiological material. Within this framework are competent authorities mandated to ensure sustenance of the nuclear regime with the security sector playing a pivotal role. However, this perspective is oftentimes not accorded adequate attention in literature. In this regard this paper maps out key actors in Nigeria’s security sector and outlines their roles in nuclear and radiological security as well as challenges and areas of improvement.

2.0 Legislative and Regulatory Framework for Nuclear and Radiological Security

According to the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 20, “the objective of a State’s nuclear security regime is to protect persons, property, society, and the environment from harmful consequences of a nuclear security event.” Thus, the IAEA emphasizes that the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials ultimately rests with the state (IAEA, 2013). The 2019 National Security Strategy of Nigeria recognizes “that the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons constitute a threat to domestic and international peace and security” (ONSA, 2019). An effective nuclear security regime depends on a country’s legislative and regulatory framework (Bello, 2017) and the IAEA requires States to establish, implement, and maintain an effective national legislative and regulatory framework to regulate the nuclear security of radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities (IAEA, 2011).

The legislative framework for regulating the possession and application of nuclear technology in Nigeria is the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act No. 19 of 1995 which established the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) as the competent national authority saddled with the responsibility for nuclear safety, security and radiological protection regulation in Nigeria (Soja, 2023; Bello, 2017). The Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act No. 19 of 1995 Act has been reviewed to the Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguard (NSSS) Bill in line with the provisions of the Amendment of the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM)(Soja, 2023) which has been passed by the House of Representatives and is awaiting action in the Senate. The Bill aims to domesticate relevant international and national Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards obligations.

Other legislation which supports the nuclear security regime include the Terrorism Prevention and Prohibition Act, (TPPA) 2022, which criminalizes acts of terrorism including the receipt or provision of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, training, transportation, false documentation or identification to terrorists for use as weapons.

3.0 Security Stakeholders in Nuclear and Radiological Security in Nigeria

The IAEA NSS No. 14 states that “the State should clearly define and assign nuclear security responsibilities to competent authorities, noting that they may include regulatory bodies, law enforcement, customs and border control, intelligence and security agencies, health agencies,

etc.” Following are the security sector component with responsibilities in nuclear and radiological security in Nigeria as depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Security stakeholders in nuclear and radiological security in Nigeria.

3.1 Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)

The Office of the National Security Adviser is responsible for the leadership, management and capacity development of the security architecture of the country (FGN, 2020). Section 4 of the National Security Agencies Act (1986) provided for the creation of ONSA to advise the President and coordinate national security matters of which nuclear security falls under. The TPPA (2022) also designates the Office of the National Security Adviser as the coordinator for all security and enforcement agencies under the Act. ONSA plays a central role in Nigeria's nuclear security regime, ensuring coordination and cooperation among relevant security agencies and other stakeholders in the nuclear sector. It has coordinated and developed national policies such as the National Security Strategy (2019), the National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (2020), the National Chemical and Biological Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (2021), and the National Crisis Management Doctrine (2022).

ONSA has also contributed to developing the National Risk Register, the Nuclear Security Support Centre Strategic document, the National Policy on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture (NSDA) amongst others. Additionally, it issues clearance and end user certificates for import of nuclear material or radioactive sources at the request of the regulator, the Nigeria Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA).

3.2 National Nuclear Security Committee (NNSC)

Nigeria established the National Nuclear Security Committee (NNSC) in 2003 for effective communications and coordination of national nuclear security activities (Bello, 2017). Its mandate among others include to strengthen national nuclear security systems in Nigeria. The NNSC is comprised of organizations with direct responsibility for nuclear security in Nigeria (according to the Draft NSSS Bill 2016) including the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Petroleum and Health.

3.3 Intelligence Agencies

The Intelligence community primarily comprises the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Department of State Services (DSS), created through the National Security agencies Act of 1986 (Omoigi, 2011).

3.3.1 Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established by the National Security Agencies Decree No. 19 of 1986. The organization was established to coordinate all intelligence activities of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Its role include the prevention and detection of crimes of

military nature against the security of Nigeria and the protection and preservation of military classified matters concerning the security of Nigeria.

3.3.2 National Intelligence Agency (NIA)

The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is to procure external intelligence for the benefit of the country's national security. NIA functions include the determination of external threats to Nigeria encompassing analysis of the immediate border, regional or global threat to the security of Nigeria.

3.3.3 Department of State Services (DSS)

The Department of State Services (DSS) is saddled with the prevention and detection in Nigeria of any threat against the internal security of Nigeria. It is enabled to perform its roles and functions by the instrument SSS No 1 of 1999 made pursuant to Section 6 of the National Security Agencies (NSA) Act of 1986 CAP 74, LFN 2004. These include; the prevention and detection of any threat against the internal security of Nigeria, the provision of protective security for sensitive installations and vetting of sensitive organizations before their incorporation as well as prospective employees to sensitive government positions and installations. The DSS has established the Simulation and Crisis Management Centre (SCMC) to coordinate response to security incidents in concert with its Explosive and Ordnance (EOD) Department. The DSS also has CBRN Desks across the 36 States and the FCT with Nuclear Security modules for training of its personnel at the various training institutions.

3.4 Law Enforcement Agencies

In the context of nuclear security, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), National Security and Civil Defence Corp (NSCDC), Federal Fire Service (FFS), Federal Road Safety Corp (FRSC) together form law enforcement with responsibility for nuclear and radiological security in Nigeria.

3.4.1 Nigerian Police Force (NPF)

The Nigeria Police Force is the principal law enforcement agency in the country (POSSAP, 2024). Sections 214 to 216 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides for the Nigeria Police Force. Section 4 of the Police Acts and Regulations lists the duties of the police force to include the prevention and detection of crimes among other law enforcement duties. In the discharge of these duties, the NPF performs some vital duties involving CBRNe detection, prevention, security and response across Nigeria, including major international land, air and sea borders. The NPF has a EOD-CBRN Command charged with detection of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, enhanced the secondary inspection techniques of officers (NPF, 2022). The NPF has established CBRN bases/units in all the states of the federation including FCT and border areas to monitor CBRN activities. It has Mobile Detection System Vans and handheld devices.

3.4.2 Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corp (NSCDC)

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corp (NSCDC) was established through the Security and Civil Defence Corps (Amendment) Act No.6 of 2007 to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the protection and rescuing of the civil population during the period of emergency. It is a para-military agency set up to provide measures against any form of attack or disaster on Nigeria and its citizenry. It was statutorily empowered by the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 and amended by Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act No. 6 of 2007. By section 3(1) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (as amended by Section 1 of Act No. 6, 2007), the functions of the Corps essential to this paper include response to CBRN incidents. Therefore, the NSCDC has a CBRNE Unit.

3.4.3 Federal Road Safety Corp (FRSC)

The Federal Road Safety Corp (FRSC) is the government agency with statutory responsibilities for road safety administration in Nigeria. Founded in 1988, it is established by law through the FRSC Establishment Act of 2007 and the agency responsible for the Domestication of UN Agreement on International Carriage of dangerous goods by road. Some of

its functions include safety of highways for motorist, diversion traffic in the case of radioactive incidents and transport security.

3.4.4 Federal Fire Service (FFS)

The Federal Fire Service was established by the Fire Service Act 1963 and is the principal agency of government responsible for the mitigation, prevention and extinction of fire and other emergencies as well as perform other sundry duties as delegated by the Honorable Minister of Interior (Federal Fire Service, 2020).

3.5 Border Control

The border control agencies in Nigeria include the Nigerian Custom Service (NCS), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) and the Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA). They are charged with the entry and exit of passengers and goods as well as manning the air, land and sea borders.

3.5.1 Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS)

The NIS is the government agency charged with the responsibility of migration management in Nigeria (NIS, n.d). The Act of Parliament of 1st August, 1963 established the organisation and is under the Ministry of Interior. It is responsible for the control of persons entering or leaving Nigeria, issuance of travel documents to Nigerians within and outside Nigeria, the issuance of residence permits to foreigners in Nigeria, border surveillance and patrol.

3.5.2 Nigeria Custom Service (NCS)

The Nigeria Custom Service (NCS) is empowered by the NCS Act of 2023 Act No. 35 to administer trade and fiscal policies of the Government as it relates to the Act (FOALEX, 2023). These include to promote trade facilitation in line with international conventions and agreements as it relates to customs administration, prevent smuggling, customs fraud and all other violations under the Act, carry out all border enforcement and regulatory activities required by law in collaboration with relevant agencies, intercept contraband such as illegal drugs and weapons, check travelers and their baggage, cargo and mail, assess and collect customs duties and other taxes on goods and services. Additionally, it is involved in monitoring, detection and interception of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at the borders. The NCS has Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) deployed at the seaport in Lagos and Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja.

3.5.3 Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN)

According to (Omisore, Eri, & Paul, 2014), the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) was established by the FAAN Act CAP 5, 2004 to among others develop, provide and maintain adequate facilities and personnel for effective security at airports in Nigeria. FAAN through the Aviation Security (AVSEC) wing ensures adequate security at the airport in concert with other security agencies to protect passengers, staff, aircraft, and airport property from accidental/malicious harm, crime, terrorism, and other threats (FAAN, 2023). AVSEC is involved in standardized screening techniques as well as controls the access to the airport's sterile areas.

3.5.4 Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA)

The Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA) came into existence as an autonomous Public Corporation with the promulgation of the Port Act in March, 1954 (Cap. 155) of the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Lagos. It commenced operations on the 1st of April, 1955 through the Port Act 1955 as amended (in 2004) and coordinates security in all seaports, dry ports and jetties. NPA through its Security Department/Terminal Security provides security at the Ports/Terminals as well as their landward and waterfront approaches together with the complement of regular and marine police units of the Ports Authority Police Commands (PAPCs), Authority-wide. The Security Department also collaborates with relevant security Front Line Officers (FLOs) deployed at the seaport.

3.6 Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN)

Section 217(1) of the 1999 Constitution established the Armed Forces comprising of an Nigerian Army (NA), the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF), together constituting the the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) (Nigeriaconstitution.com, 2014). Section 217-220 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria charged the AFN with defending Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air; suppress insurrection and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order, when called upon to do so by the President. The AFN has an existing EOD team which respond to CBRNE related threats. In cases of severe nuclear or radiological accident the AFN is expected to provide in co-ordination with NEMA technical support for mitigation of the accident and recovery operations including where necessary evacuation and relocation of affected persons (NNREP, 2010).

4.0 Other Relevant Agencies

4.1 Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA)

The NNRA was established in 1995 through the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act, 1995 (No. 19). NNRA provides regulatory oversight on all facilities utilizing radioactive sources and ionizing radiation generating equipment in Nigeria thereby ensuring safe management after use in line with radiation protection standards (Soja, 2023). Thus, it regulates activities of radiation service providers, mining industries, education and research, agriculture and water resources, nuclear installations the health sector, petroleum and manufacturing industry. It is responsible for receiving initial notification of a potential radiological emergency, getting basic information about the emergency and providing initial advice to the caller and to also carry out initial radiological assessment according to the NNREP.

4.2 Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC)

Act 46 of 1976 created the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC) as the national focal agency for the promotion and development of peaceful use of atomic energy (Agu, 2019) now under the Presidency. It is charged with the principal responsibility of developing the framework and technical pathway to explore, exploit and harness atomic energy for peaceful applications in all its ramifications for the socioeconomic development of Nigeria. Additionally, NAEC is Nigeria's National Liaison Office for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this regard, the Commission coordinates Nigeria's participation in IAEA's National, Regional, and international projects. NAEC is in charge of the Centre for Energy Research and Training (CERT) in Zaria and the Centre for Energy Research Development (CERD) Ibadan.

4.3 National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) was established via Act 12 as amended by Act 50 of 1999, to manage disasters in Nigeria. It is charged to formulate policy on all activities relating to disaster management in Nigeria and co-ordinate the plans and programmes for efficient and effective response to disasters at national level. NEMA coordinates planning efforts for preparedness for and response to nuclear security events as the national coordinating authority for radiological emergencies as stipulated in the NNREP.

4.4 Licensee/operators

A licensee or operator is any company, organization, institution, or other entity to which a general license or specific license to construct or operate a nuclear facility, or to receive, possess, use, transfer, or dispose of source material, by-product material, or special nuclear material. An example of an operator is CERT, Zaria, which operates a research reactor and the Gamma Irradiation Facility in Sheda, near Abuja.

5.0 Role of Security Agencies in Nuclear and Radiological Security

Security agencies in Nigeria work closely with other competent authorities and stakeholders to prevent, detect and respond to radiological threats, protecting the community and environment. Specifically, security agencies play the following roles;

a) **Intelligence gathering and threat assessment:** Nigeria's intelligence agencies collect and analyze information on potential radiological threats or illicit activities. This serves as input into the threat assessment for the nuclear sector used to produce the design basis threat (DBT) and threat statement in concert with other stakeholders. Security agencies gather intelligence on threat actors, conduct threat assessments, and monitor activities related to nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. They analyze threats and vulnerabilities to develop strategies for prevention and response.

b) **Detection through FLOs:** The DSS, NPF NCS, NIS and AFN have personnel deployed at various entry points into Nigeria in a multiagency setting. They monitor, detect, and intercept illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at the borders and contact the NNRA for radiological assessment of any seized radioactive and/or nuclear materials.

c) **Transport Security.** The NPF, DSS, FRSC and components of the AFN are often involved in transportation security of radioactive materials to prevent hijacking or theft. A case in point was during the conversion of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) reactor core in CERT, Zaria (Mehta, 2019).

d) **Armed response to nuclear security events:** Security agencies form component of the off-site response team to nuclear security events to intercept and recover stolen or illicitly trafficked radioactive source and neutralize potential threats.

e) **Vetting/background checks:** The DSS is saddled with the responsibility of vetting prospective employees into sensitive government organizations such as nuclear installations. It also supports the nuclear sector Human Reliability Programme (HRP) and conducts background checks for trustworthiness verification. In addition, it conducts security clearances, and training programmes for personnel working in nuclear facilities or handling radioactive materials to prevent insider threats and unauthorized access to sensitive areas or information.

f) **Physical security/vulnerability assessment:** Security agencies by virtue of their mandates are responsible for physical security and vulnerability assessment of sensitive installations including nuclear facilities. This may include perimeter security, access control, intrusion detection systems, surveillance, and armed response teams.

g) **Investigations:** The NPF and the DSS have mandates to investigate nuclear security events in liaison with the NNRA and NAEC.

h) **Conduct of regular Simulation Exercises (SIMEX):** Security agencies regularly conduct joint simulation exercises involving nuclear security scenarios to prepare for nuclear and radiological incidents and respond to same accordingly.

6.0 Notable Achievements

The international cooperation facilitated by ONSA has birthed some achievements in the nuclear sector. They include;

- i. The production of the National Crisis Management Doctrine (NCMD) which provides an overarching framework for response to crisis incidents with assigned roles and responsibilities to various stakeholders including the nuclear sector.
- ii. Receipt of five (5) MDS Vans donated to the Nigeria Police Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal-Chemical Biological Radiological, and Nuclear defense (EOD-CBRN) Command by the US Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Smuggling, Detection, and Deterrence (NSDD) (NPF, 2022).
- iii. Development of the National Risk Assessment document in concert with international partners which the nuclear industry has benefited from in the area of threat assessment.

- iv. Design of the NSDA document, a policy framework for early detection, analysis and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control towards ensuring national security (West, 2023).
- v. Nigeria has commenced development of the Nuclear Security Policy document in partnership with the IAEA. This process is being midwived by ONSA.
- vi. The inclusion of nuclear incident scenarios into National Crisis Response Exercises to test and validate interoperability of security agencies during response to nuclear and radiological incidents.
- vii. Integrating nuclear security measures into existing security arrangements during Major Public Events (MPE).

7.0 Challenges

It is evident that Nigeria has an established nuclear security regime through a robust legislative and institutional framework for nuclear and radiological security. However, there are areas in need of improvement necessary to strengthen the existing arrangement. These include the areas of legislation, infrastructure/equipment, training, and low public awareness.

i. Non-passage of the NSSS Bill 2022.

The non-passage of the Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards (NSSS) Bill by the legislature leaves gaps in the legal framework necessary for effective nuclear security measures. The NSSS Bill draws from the Amendment of the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM)(Soja, 2023) and is expected to provide a wholistic legal framework for nuclear and radiological security in Nigeria.

ii. Infrastructure/Equipment

Although some security agencies have a number of equipment, there is still a insufficient detection equipment particularly for FLOs at the border control points. This hampers detection and interdiction efforts of security agencies and could undermines the reliability and effectiveness of nuclear security operations. Also, the slow pace of technology adoption and acquisition often due to their cost means that security agencies may lag behind in deploying advanced technologies to address emerging threats. There is also a need for a national assessment of equipment requirement to prioritize procurement efforts and allocate resources effectively.

iii. Human Capacity Development/Training

While much efforts have been devoted to the development of human capacity in the country nuclear sector, more attention is required in training needs assessment at organizational and national level to identify training gaps on nuclear and radiological security for security agencies. Furthermore, the NSSC requires additional support with requisite curriculum and equipment to cater to the nuclear security training needs of security agencies. The availability of necessary resources and infrastructure is essential for the NSSC to provide comprehensive nuclear security training as well as specialized training to have qualified personnel tasked with detection, handling and containment of MORC.

iv. Low Public Awareness

There is an observed general low level of awareness on nuclear matters among the public. To adequately secure nuclear and other radioactive materials in the country requires a populace that is largely aware of their uses, applications and dangers/threats to better appreciate the need for their security. This is exemplified in the activities of scrap dealers who are unable to distinguish radioactive sources for adequate disposal.

8.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

The application of nuclear and other radioactive materials is varied across various sectors of Nigeria's economy. Nigeria has a well- established nuclear security regime to secure nuclear and radioactive material within her domain while contributing to international efforts to curb illicit trafficking. Security agencies in Nigeria as competent authorities continue to play essential roles

within the nuclear security regime in concert with other stakeholders like the NNRA, NAEC and licensees. Deployed along border crossings and serving across towns and cities, they constitute the front line of defense for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radioactive sources and response to nuclear security events. They also contribute to policy document formulation and liaise with international and regional partners to strengthen global nuclear and radiological norms. Despite their contributions, the strengthening of the legislative framework through the prompt passage of the NSSS Bill by the current National Assembly (NASS), sustained training and procurement of state-of-the-art equipment will help to enhance their roles.

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